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Are Forecasting Models Usable 
for Policy Analysis?* 
Christopher A. Sims 
Professor of Economics 
University of Minnesota 
In one of the early papers describing the applications of 
vector autoregression (VAR) models to economics, 
Thomas Sargent (1979) emphasized that while such 
models were useful for forecasting, they could not be used 
for policy analysis. Recently this point has been vigor-
ously reasserted, by Sargent himself (1984) and by 
Edward Learner (1985) among others. 
The point has required vigorous reassertion because 
VAR models are used widely, and few who use them stay 
pure—in the sense of never thinking about their implica-
tions for policy—for very long. There are several reason-
able ways to generate conditional forecasts from VAR 
models. Once one has seen how easy it is to obtain a 
forecast conditional on a certain configuration of policy 
variables, it is tempting to make such forecasts and 
difficult to be sure that they do not influence one's 
opinions on policy choices. Robert Litterman, a leader in 
demonstrating the value of VAR models in forecasting, 
has also developed methods to use them to make forecasts 
conditional on policy choices and even to use them in 
computing optimal policy rules. (See, for example, 
Litterman 1982, 1984.) 
A similar paradox concerns the position of the large 
commercial econometric forecasting models. I was 
present at a recent round table discussion in which a 
distinguished theoretical economist offhandedly asserted 
that, since these commercial models are intended for 
forecasting, no one takes them seriously as economics. 
The rational expectations critique of the use of such 
models in policy analysis is now more than ten years old 
and, in a good part of the economics profession, has the 
position of the established orthodoxy. Yet when actual 
policy choices are being made at all levels of the public 
and private sectors, forecasts from these large models, 
both conditional and unconditional, remain pervasively 
influential. The rational expectations school began with a 
program for providing an alternative to such models for 
quantitative policy analysis, but the program has had little 
practical impact. 
Why is this? Are the people who actually make policy 
unable to understand the futility of using VAR models or 
conventional econometric models as an aid to policy 
choice? Or are the abstract arguments against using such 
models this way missing something important? 
Why Making Policy With a Forecasting Model 
Is Supposed to Be a Mistake 
There are two related versions of the argument against 
using forecasting models for policy analysis. One is that 
such models are nothing more than summary descriptions 
of the historical data, usually based on sample correla-
tions. While such a description can be extrapolated into a 
useful forecast, supposing that it can be the basis for 
projecting the effects of policy choice amounts to taking 
correlation to indicate causation, which we all understand 
to be fallacious. 
^Research for this paper was supported by National Science Foundation 
Grant SES-8309329. 
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The argument in this form applies directly to VAR 
models, which are forthrightly descriptive statistical 
models that do nothing more than summarize correlations 
in a convenient way. The argument also applies indirectly 
to the use of large commercial models, since many 
economists (myself included) regard the economic inter-
pretations those models give their own equations as 
strained and fragile. Despite the fragility of those inter-
pretations, the models are clearly useful in forecasting. 
Economists who accept this form of the argument against 
forecasting models as policy tools may be ready to reject 
the use of commercial models for policy analysis despite 
admitting their value for forecasting. 
Sargent (1984) puts forward a second version of the 
argument against using forecasting models for policy 
analysis. He observes that VAR models usually incor-
porate policy variables into the model symmetrically with 
other variables, treating them all as random variables. He 
agrees that, in principle, policy choices are random 
variables, with uncertainty about them an important 
influence on actual behavior. However, when we choose 
a policy, we do not usually roll the dice; instead, we 
ordinarily have to make a unique choice which to us has a 
deterministic character. We cannot reasonably think 
about such a choice within the confines of a model in 
which policy is determined by some random mechanism. 
When properly interpreted, both versions of the 
argument are correct, even tautological. It is impossible to 
use a statistical model to analyze policy without going 
behind the correlations to make an economic interpreta-
tion of them. Generating such an interpretation is what 
econometricians call identification of a model. And one 
cannot analyze the choice of policy variables without 
cutting through the seamless web of a model in which all 
policy variables are determined inside the model. (In fact, 
these arguments even apply to the use of a model for 
forecasting.) 
But these correct arguments do not constitute an 
objection to the use of forecasting models to guide policy 
choice. They only point out that when we find a way to 
use such a model to guide policy choice we are, implicitly 
or explicitly, supplementing it with an identifying inter-
pretation. To argue against using such models to guide 
policy choice, we have to compare their identifying 
interpretations to alternatives. The real choice is between 
methods of policy analysis based on spare identifications, 
in which simple, weak identifying assumptions just suf-
ficient to bring a forecasting model to bear on a policy 
issue are imposed, versus alternatives based on elaborate, 
strong identifying assumptions which lead to models with 
poor forecasting properties. 
Reduced Form, Structure, and Identification 
These three terms—reduced form, structure, and identifi-
cation—are used in different ways by economists and are 
used outside of economics in still other ways. In one 
common pattern of usage, a reduced form is a model 
that describes how some historical data, which we can 
call X, was generated by some random mechanism. 
When we estimate a reduced form model, we construct 
some statistics that summarize the full data set X. The 
reduced form model can be thought of as a rationale for a 
particular kind of data summary. 
A structure, or structural model, is a model we can use 
in decisionmaking. It generates predictions of results Z of 
various kinds of actions A we might take. The notions of 
structure and reduced form are implicit in most kinds of 
use of data to aid decisionmaking, but when an econo-
metrician uses these notions he generally explicitly 
displays a reduced form as probability distributionp (X; p) 
for the data as a function of reduced form parameters 
j5 and displays a structure as a conditional distribution 
q(Z | A; a) of results given actions, depending on un-
known structural parameters a. Identifying a model is 
then asserting a connection between the reduced form and 
the structure, so that estimates of the reduced form 
parameters (3 can be used to determine the structural 
parameters a.
1 
Reduced to simplest terms, identification is the inter-
pretation of historically observed variation in data in a 
way that allows the variation to be used to predict the 
consequences of an action not yet undertaken. Making 
this connection between data and consequences of de-
cisions is never trivial, and it always is more difficult the 
more remote is the action we contemplate taking from any 
historically observable event. If we are lucky, there may 
be much historical random variation in actions that are 
very similar to the action we now contemplate. Then we 
may be able to use the data rather directly to decide the 
likely effect of our actions. But sometimes we must 
contemplate actions very different from those observed 
historically, in which case identification becomes more 
difficult and controversial. 
In economics, structural models are often formulated 
so that every parameter in the vector a has an economic 
interpretation. That is, the elements of a will be things like 
lln engineering control theory, identification is used to refer to what 
econometricians would call estimation of a certain class of parameters. In 
statistics, identification is the question of whether or not a model's parameters map 
one-to-one into probability distributions for the data. Both usages are related to the 
econometric usage described in the text, but there is not much point in explaining 
the connections here. 
3 "interest-elasticity of demand for money" or "elasticity 
of substitution between electric power and labor in milk 
production." In contrast, the elements of the ft vector are 
usually harder to interpret because they reflect combined 
influences of behavior in many sectors of the economy. 
There is no unique standard, however, for when a 
parameter has an economic interpretation. The param-
eters in a model may have interpretations, yet the model 
may not be structural, in the sense that we may be unable 
to use it to predict the consequences of the actions which 
interest us. Conversely, we may be able to use a model to 
make such predictions accurately even though some or all 
of its parameters do not have neat interpretations. 
The formal mathematics of asserting a connection 
between a reduced form model and a nonstructural model 
that has a satisfying interpretation is no different from the 
formal mathematics of asserting a connection between 
the reduced form and a structure. Many economists have 
come to think of structural models as models with 
satisfying interpretations for all parameters. The un-
arguable assertion that predicting the effects of policy 
requires identification of a structural model thus be-
comes, via a semantic confusion, a source of serious 
misunderstanding.
2 
Examples of Identification in Decisionmaking 
To bring this abstract discussion down to earth, I present 
a series of examples of the application of statistical 
models to decisionmaking. 
• The Spreadsheet 
Perhaps the simplest and most widely used form of 
quantitative modeling as an aid to policy choice is 
spreadsheet financial modeling. Here accounting identi-
ties and a few simple relations among accounting cate-
gories characterizing average historical behavior are used 
as a framework for projecting the consequences of 
business decisions. In this type of modeling, there is no 
explicit probability model, though the use of average past 
behavior to extrapolate the future implies some beliefs 
about the probability structure of the data. The reduced 
form is implicit in the particular categories used to report 
and summarize the accounting data in terms of gross 
margins, returns on equity, productivity ratios, and so 
forth. The structure generally is formed by assuming that 
certain historically observed average ratios in the ac-
counting data are likely to persist under various changes 
in business strategy and hence can be used to project the 
effects of variations in strategy. Everyone understands 
that such models are subject to many limitations; none-
theless, because the models impose some consistency on 
projections of long lists of interrelated numbers, they are 
helpful. The models' identifying assumptions are seldom 
the focus of much explicit attention, though users under-
stand that the assumptions are crude approximations and 
therefore judgmentally discount the model results ac-
cordingly. 
• Clinical Trials in Medicine 
Another example, in some ways even simpler, arises in 
clinical trials in medicine. We might have results from a 
study of 200 patients, 100 given the old treatment and 
100 given the new treatment. The results might be 
reported as cross-classified into 16 categories by age, 
race, and sex of the patient. The complete cross-tabula-
tion can be regarded as a set of reduced form parameter 
estimates. Say that 80 of those given the new treatment 
were cured, while only 30 of those given the old treatment 
were cured. A doctor using this study might take it to 
mean that the new treatment is better and proceed to 
prefer it over the old for all his patients. He would be 
taking the overall proportion of the patients in the study 
who benefited from each treatment to be a good indicator 
of the probability that a patient of his will benefit from the 
treatment. His structural model would implicitly discount 
the variation across age-race-sex categories as unimpor-
tant random variation. 
But suppose the doctor's first patient for whom the 
study is relevant is a 24-year-old black male. The doctor 
happens to recall that there were only 4 black males 
between 15 and 25 years old in the study and, further, that 
those given the old treatment survived and those given the 
new treatment died. Given this information, the doctor 
probably will still choose the new treatment, but the 
choice is not automatic and will depend on details of the 
data and on the doctor's beliefs about how the treatments 
work—that is, whether there is any reason to suppose the 
treatments would work differently in general on young 
black men. 
This kind of question in fact arises with any patient: Is 
this particular patient "like" the patients in the sample so 
2The sense in which structural is used here, though somewhat in conflict with 
the common usage pointed out in the text, is well founded in earlier treatments of 
these issues—for example, those by Hurwicz (1962) and Koopmans and Bausch 
(1959). Economists should standardize usage so that structural is always 
connected to a claim of usefulness in the prediction of the effects of actions. In 
contrast, reduced form is more widely used to refer to a transformation of some 
initial interpretable model into a form that is in some way more convenient but less 
easy to interpret. One can imagine a model useful for predicting the effects of policy 
that is a reduced form transformation of a model with a more elaborate set of 
behavioral interpretations. Such a model could be both structural and, in a sense, a 
reduced form. I see no harm in using reducedform in this way, though in this paper 
I will stick to the more stringent usage in which a reduced form model is taken never 
to be structural. 
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that results from the sample are relevant? Can the results 
be extrapolated to age or ethnic groups not represented in 
the sample at all? Should a veterinarian give any weight to 
this study of humans in deciding how to treat horses? This 
is the identification problem. 
• Forecasting 
In economics, the use of a forecast implies that some 
decision is being made which may be influenced by beliefs 
about the future path of the economy. The reduced form 
model describes the data at each historical date t as drawn 
from a probability distribution conditioned on data up 
through t— 1, usually with the form of that distribution the 
same for all dates t. In a pure forecasting situation, the 
structure asserts that the distribution of next period's data 
is unaffected by any action we may take, but that it is 
related to data up through the current period in the same 
way that data at t has been related to data up through t— 1 
at all historical dates t. But there is always a question as to 
whether or not this particular date is different from what 
we have seen historically: Will this quarter be the one in 
which our forecasting model finally breaks down? And 
there is also always a question as to whether or not the 
decision we are making does in fact have no impact on 
next period's data. If the decision is whether or not to take 
out a home mortgage, then there is probably no impact; 
but if it is whether or not to lay off 10,000 workers, the 
answer may not be so clear. 
• Macroeconomic Policy 
When macroeconomic models are used to project the 
effects of policy, the most common procedure begins with 
a model in which policy variables appear explicitly and in 
which those variables are taken as predetermined. That 
is, the model is in a form where nonpolicy variables at a 
given date are determined by taking policy variables at 
that date as given. Policy options are then defined as time 
paths of the policy variables, and the equations of the 
model are used to solve for paths of other variables 
corresponding to the various policy options. 
While the algebra of this procedure is straightforward, 
the interpretation of it as an identification of a reduced 
form is not. Suppose the model is linear and complete in 
that it can be solved for all variables it contains except the 
policy variables.
3 Letting the policy variables be X and 
the other variables be Y, a system of equations for all the 
variables has the form 
(1) V(t)A = X(t)B + Z(t~X)C + e(t) 
(2) X(t) = Z(t~\)D + u(t) 
where Z(t— 1) is the vector of all lagged values ofX and Y 
that enter the system, where the first block of equations 
is the model, and where the second block of equations are 
prediction equations for the policy variables. We find 
paths for future Y corresponding to paths for X by fixing 
the X paths and solving for Y using the first block of 
equations. When we do this, we are setting the dis-
turbances e(t) in the first block of equations to zero while 
adjusting the residuals u(t) in the second block to achieve 
the hypothetical paths for X which represent policy 
choices. Variation in policy is being represented entirely 
through variation in u(t), with no variation in e(t). 
The equations of the model have been fitted to 
historical data. For it to be reasonable to project the 
effects of policy by setting e to zero and varying u, it must 
first be true that historically the u(t)
9s and e(t)'s have 
been unrelated, and second be reasonable to suppose that 
prediction errors for policy variables can be identified 
with policy choices. It is not necessary that the only 
source of prediction error in policy variables be policy 
changes, but all sources of prediction error for policy 
variables must have the same sort of effect on the 
economy as policy changes. For example, in a period 
when the monetary authority was maintaining stable 
interest rates, money stock variations would—at least in 
the short run—directly reflect shifts in money demand. 
Treating money stock as a policy variable according to 
the conventional methodology of policy projection would 
then lead to serious mistakes, since it would imply a 
mistaken identification of the historical effects of money 
demand shifts with the effects of policy-generated shifts in 
money stock. 
• An Excise Tax 
A statistical model need not contain policy variables in 
order to be useful in projecting the effects of policy. The 
simplest textbook example of econometric identification 
is a model for supply and demand, say 
Demand 
(3) p(t) = S + oq{t) + py(t) + ii(0 
Supply 
(4) p(t) = 0 + yq(t) + ttw(0 + vit) 
3 If it is not complete, it can be completed by adding forecasting equations for 
any nonpolicy predetermined variables. In order to make projections with the 
model, this has to be done implicitly in any case, since all variables in the model will 
have to be forecast. 
5 where p is price, q is quantity, y is income, and w is 
weather. Though this model does not contain an excise 
tax variable, it can be used to predict the effects of an 
excise tax. Let the excise tax rate at t be f(t). Then if there 
was no tax in the past, we can still predict the effects of a 
tax paid by producers by introducing/into the supply 
equation (4), making it 
(5) [1 ~f(t)]p(t) = 0 + r9(0 + + v(r). 
Solving for p and q, we can obtain 
(6) p(t) = {y[S + py(t) + 11(f)] 
- a[0 + 7w(f) + v(f)]} 
+ {y-a[l -/(f)]} 
(7) q(t) = {[1 -f(t)][S + M) + «(0] 
+ [0 + 7TW(t) + v(f)]} 
-{y-a[l -/(f)]> 
which can be used to predict the effects of the tax rate f(t) 
for given values of weather and income, which are treated 
as determined outside this market. 
In this example the historical responses of prices and 
quantities to movements in weather and income are being 
used to predict their responses to a previously untried 
excise tax. This is an intellectually appealing trick, so 
much so that economists sometimes forget that it would 
really be better to have some historical data from a period 
in which there was an actual excise tax. In that case the 
system (6)-(7) could be estimated directly. When we 
have to derive (6)—(7) from (3)-(4), we rely on some 
strong assumptions. Among these is the assumption that 
the dynamics which have been historically adequate to 
model market price fluctuations will also suffice to model 
responses to a more persistent change in price due to 
taxation. Another is the assumption that industry supply 
behavior is perfectly competitive.
4 
• Rational Expectations Policy Analysis 
The ideal policy evaluation procedure of the rational 
expectations school—what Sargent (1984) has in mind 
as an alternative to methods closely tied to VAR 
models—begins with a dynamic probability model for the 
economy. We can label this whole model Y There is also 
a probability law for policy variables, which we can label 
X. Though the policy variables have varied historically, 
the rational expectations school makes a sharp distinction 
between changes in policy variables and changes in the 
probability law governing policy variables. Only the latter 
are taken to be "real" changes in policy. In the ideal 
framework, X has not changed at all historically. We 
contemplate making a single, permanent change in X. 
Getting historical data in which X has not changed to tell 
us something about what will happen to Y when we do 
change X is not impossible. It is qualitatively similar to 
the problem of predicting the effect of a never-before-tried 
excise tax, as discussed previously, though the rational 
expectations identification problem is even more interest-
ing and intellectually challenging. 
As Hansen and Sargent (1980) outlined it, the rational 
expectations prescription is that parameters of "objective 
functions of agents" be estimated. These parameters, 
often described as characterizing "tastes and technol-
ogy," are taken to be invariant to the government decision 
rule X and also to be sufficient to determine the reaction of 
the economy to permanent, one-time changes in the 
decision rule. Both in claiming to be able to estimate all 
the relevant aspects of tastes and technology and in 
claiming to be able to use them to predict reactions to 
changes in X, we will have to make assumptions that are 
an order of magnitude more elaborate and questionable 
than those required in the excise tax example. 
Just as in the excise tax example, we are really better 
off if the change in probability law for policy variables that 
we contemplate implementing has precedents. In that 
case both Y and X need time arguments, and we have to 
consider how to construct a dynamic model connecting 
X(t) to Y(t). In this model, the values of policy variables 
will be determined in two steps—firstX(r) is determined, 
then the values of policy variables are generated by X(t). 
X(t) itself is not then the probability law generating policy 
variables but a piece or stage of that probability law. 
Nonetheless, if X(t) is what we are in the process of 
choosing, what we need is the distribution of the future 
path of Y(t) given our deliberate choice of a path forX(r). 
The fact that Y(t) and X{t) now represent probability 
laws, not values of real variables, does not change the 
basic nature of the identification problem. 
By considering standard policy evaluation procedures 
applied in a situation where policy changes actually shift 
the linear structure of the economy by changing expecta-
tion formation rules, the rational expectations critique 
4If industry supply behavior is not competitive, equations (6)-(7) will not be a 
correct description of industry behavior under the tax, even though the historical 
behavior of price, quantity, income, and weather data may be indistinguishable 
from that generated by competitive supply behavior. 
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points out one important dimension in which such 
procedures can fail. If policy shifts at random intervals on 
the order of ten years long between, say, inflationary 
expansion of demand and contractionary policies, then 
expectation formation by the public will differ between 
the two types of regime. It is likely that the economy will 
be best modeled nonlinearly, possibly shifting systemat-
ically between two different limiting linear structures as 
evidence of a policy regime shift accumulates. The ideal 
model will include a complete and accurate description of 
how expectation formation shifts with policy changes. 
Such a model will probably show nonlinear responses to 
changes in the paths of policy variables. A model that 
ignores this nonlinearity will be inaccurate, though pos-
sibly accurate for short-term prediction within regimes. 
But a model may correctly take account of the non-
linearity without explicitly modeling expectation forma-
tion. Such a model can even give accurate guidance to 
policymakers about the effects of a shift in regimes. In the 
sense we are giving the term, the model is structural, not a 
reduced form, even though some of its parameters will 
confound influences of demand with supply or influences 
of expectation formation with adjustment costs. 
Even a model that does not ignore nonlinearity would 
be accurate only so long as the probability law historically 
governing the process of regime shifting remains constant. 
But it is not true that there is no "real" change in policy 
without a change in this probability law. The fact that the 
public has in mind some probability distribution over 
possible actions by a policymaker does not mean he faces 
no real choice. In fact, the rational public will always have 
such a distribution over all the policy choices which are 
truly possible. There is nonetheless a well-defined notion 
of a conditional probability distribution of the economy's 
future path given policy actions. This conditional distribu-
tion is what the policymaker needs to make his choice, 
and its existence does not conflict with the public's having 
in mind at the same time a probability distribution over his 
possible choices. It is also not true that the existence of a 
probability law governing policy implies that there can be 
no scientific advance in the making of policy. A rational 
public may expect occasional improvements in policy-
making, though the timing of the improvements is likely to 
remain surprising. If this were true, the dynamic structure 
of the economy would drift through time as policymaking 
improved. A model that ignored this source of non-
linearity would be inaccurate, but again a model can 
allow for this nonlinearity without introducing detailed 
interpretations of all its parameters. 
The most prominent examples of situations in which 
economists are attracted strongly to the rational expecta-
tions approach to policy analysis are sudden sharp 
changes in policy institutions—shifts from fixed to flex-
ible exchange rates (or vice versa) or monetary and fiscal 
reforms that end hyperinflations. One could in principle 
attempt to predict the effects of such policy shifts using 
data from periods in which the shocks to the economy are 
less extreme and of a completely different nature. One 
could use data from a period in which inflation showed 
slight variation, monetary policy was stable, and eco-
nomic fluctuations arose mainly from the effects of 
weather on agricultural yields to estimate utility and 
production functions for the economy. If this estimation 
were successful, it could, under the usual auxiliary 
assumptions of rational expectations, be used to predict 
the effects of a shift from fixed to flexible exchange rates 
or of fiscal reform to end an inflation. Most economists 
would, however, have little confidence in such an exer-
cise. Even those who believe it is useful to think of tastes 
and technology as determining the economy's reaction to 
policy—even they understand that econometric esti-
mates of utility and production functions are more or less 
crude approximations. And they understand that the 
validity of those approximations must be expected to 
deteriorate as the model is extrapolated to situations 
further and further outside the range of variation observed 
in the data. 
Sargent (1982) has done some empirical analysis of 
such policy changes, taking a rational expectations 
perspective but using a methodology that weakens this 
objection. He studies a number of historical examples of 
economic policy shifts that ended strong inflations and 
suggests that they carry lessons for counterinflationary 
policy generally. This approach avoids the need to project 
the effects of such large policy changes purely from 
historical data in which there have been no such changes 
combined with a fragile structure of assumptions. How-
ever, as in any study which brings data to bear on policy 
choice, there are disputable identifying assumptions: Is 
the success of these reforms due to a policymaker having 
decided on the right series of actions? Or is it instead part 
of the dynamics of hyperinflations that at a certain stage 
such actions finally become possible? Can we deduce the 
effect of modest policy actions on minor inflations by 
scaling down the effects of drastic policy actions on great 
inflations? Or is the world more nonlinear than that? 
There is no difference in principle between these 
questions about Sargent's historical analysis and the 
corresponding questions about the use of a VAR model to 
project the effects of tighter monetary policy next year 
when we identify tighter monetary policy with positive 
residuals in the model's interest rate equation. Of course, 
7 concretely there may be a difference. Some may feel the 
questions about Sargent's identifying assumptions in 
applying the hyperinflation studies are more or less telling 
than those about identifying prediction errors in interest 
rates with policy. The point is that in any empirical study 
there will be debatable questions about identification— 
questions that will leave us more or less uncomfortable 
about applying the conclusions. The rational expecta-
tions framework raises such issues from a different angle, 
but it cannot avoid them. 
Rational Expectations Models Versus 
Policy Analysis With Forecasting Models 
Obviously, in principle, a rational expectations equilib-
rium model can be as good a forecasting model as a VAR 
model. In fact, in a world in which people were rational 
and markets were competitive, one might expect that the 
best forecasting models would all be rational expectations 
equilibrium models. 
Possibly not so obviously, there is no logical incon-
sistency between a world of competitive markets and 
rational people and a world in which the best forecasting 
models are VAR models and optimal policy can be made 
by using VAR models under the simplest of identifying 
assumptions. This latter point requires some extended 
mathematical argument and is developed fully in a recent 
paper of mine (Sims 1985). 
Thus, in the abstract, a model could include linear 
VAR models and nonlinear rational expectations equilib-
rium models as special cases of a more general frame-
work. But in actual problems of policy choice and 
forecasting, there are tradeoffs. Rational expectations 
models have not been used successfully for large-scale 
macroeconomic forecasting. Despite their apparent 
naivete, nonstochastic spreadsheet approaches to model-
ing are more commonly used than conventional econo-
metric models, VAR models, or rational expectations 
models. Since computers and human minds are both 
limited, a model's complexity must also be limited. 
On the one hand, if one believes that the dynamic 
mechanisms of rational expectations are important and 
that we know enough about their nature to recover them 
from the data, then it may be worth accepting the burden 
of unbelievable simplifying assumptions which are in-
evitable in a usable rational expectations model. One 
accepts that the resulting model will not be a good 
forecasting model because of a belief that having rational 
expectations mechanisms explicitly in the model may 
make it more accurate in some kinds of policy analysis. 
Since the model is worse as a forecasting model, it is 
obvious that decreased accuracy in some kinds of policy 
analysis is being traded off against a hope for increased 
accuracy in some others. 
On the other hand, one might believe that we know too 
little about the nature of dynamic economic behavior for 
careful modeling of rational expectations dynamics to be 
very helpful. In that case, using a model which aims at 
finding a conditional distribution of economic outcomes 
given policy actions, without detailing all the dynamic 
optimization underlying that conditional distribution, 
may look more attractive. 
VAR methods have one deep conceptual advantage 
over current implementations of rational expectations 
equilibrium models: they make the connection of the 
model to a reduced form forecasting model completely 
explicit. This means that one can validate the probability 
assumptions in the reduced form by giving it a dry run 
through the historical data, having it generate forecasts 
with data available at each date in the past. The model's 
own probability distribution for forecast errors can be 
compared to the observed sample distribution of forecast 
errors. In contrast, standard econometric models and, 
even more so, rational expectations equilibrium models, 
cannot do this. A major part of the uncertainty about 
forecasts from both types of models is uncertainty about 
the fragile identifying assumptions built into them. 
Though the models are probabilistic, the distributions 
they generate for their own forecast errors are of limited 
practical use, since they ignore error arising from un-
certainties in their own specification. Economists gen-
erally tend to put forward policy conclusions and fore-
casts as if they were surer of them than they ought to be, 
based on any objective evidence. This tendency is 
reinforced by the use of apparently scientific mathe-
matical models that ignore a prime source of uncertainty 
about their conclusions. But VAR methods, or any others 
that close the gap between model stochastic specification 
and the observed forecast error distribution, hold the 
promise of grounding policy discussion much more firmly 
on objective facts. 
In predicting the effects of policy actions, identifying 
assumptions will be required to make use of VAR models. 
These assumptions will be of uncertain validity. The point 
of VAR-based policy evaluation is to display explicitly 
the imposition of identifying assumptions on a carefully 
grounded reduced form forecasting model. This makes it 
easier to separate analysis of uncertainty about identifi-
cation from analysis of uncertainty about the probability 
structure of the data. 
Thus it remains true that there are two very different 
modern approaches to macroeconomic policy analysis: 
the first is a heavily empirical style, which ties analysis 
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closely to forecasting models; the second is the rational 
expectations style, which is more complicated, less 
closely tied to data, more respectable in the eyes of most 
macroeconomists, and less used. From what has been 
said so far, perhaps the reader will agree that the issue is 
whether, in a particular application, one approach or the 
other requires implausible identifying assumptions. 
There is no general argument that one approach avoids 
difficulties which the other approach does not. 
Identifying VAR Models 
This section of the paper describes a class of convenient 
identifying restrictions on VAR models. Benefiting from 
it requires some previous exposure to econometric 
theory. (Less technically inclined readers can still per-
haps gain some insight from the example presented in the 
next section without reading this one.) 
The simplest way to achieve an identifying interpreta-
tion of a VAR model for policy choice is to assume that 
policy variation can be identified with the residual in one 
(or more) of the model's equations. In that case, policy 
projections can be made in the standard way—by drop-
ping the policy equations from the model and treating the 
others as exact. This way of achieving identification is, as 
we pointed out, exactly what underlies the usual use of 
econometric models to project the effects of policy, 
whether they are explicitly VAR models or not. It is also 
exactly the identifying assumption underlying rational 
expectations monetarist models, in which unpredictable 
changes in money stock are postulated to be generated 
entirely by erratic policy choices.
5 It is, however, a 
restrictive approach to interpreting a model. 
Recently a number of economists have explored ways 
to interpret VAR models which preserve a good deal of 
the simplicity and convenience of identifying policy with 
prediction errors in policy variables, without being quite 
so restrictive.
6 The setup is as follows. We suppose that 
there are behaviorally distinct sources of variation col-
lected in a vector e(t) and that these sources drive 
variation in the economy. Some elements of e(t) are 
random fluctuations in policy. A model connects the 
observable vector of data, Y(t), to current and past values 
of the driving disturbances according to 
(8) XloA(s)Y(ts) = Z^B(s)e(t-s). 
The VAR model for Y will have the form 
(9) Y(t) = X~ C(s)Y(ts) + u(t) 
s—l 
where u(t) is the one-step-ahead prediction error in Y. 
Equation (9) can be solved to yield the impulse response 
matrixes for Yy G(.s), which satisfy 
(10) Y(t) = 2T G(s)u(t-s) + H(m)Y(t-m) 
s=0 
where H(m) depends on m but the G sequence does not. 
The ith row,Jth column of G(s), G0 (s) gives the response 
of Y((t+s) to a unit disturbance in Uj(t). A good part of the 
appeal of VAR models as descriptive devices is that the u 
vector, or at least some elements of it, is often under 
plausible identifying assumptions nearly the same as 
some elements of the e vector. In that case, part of the G 
matrix can be interpreted directly as responses to policy 
actions. 
However, the general situation is that the behavioral 
disturbances of equation (8) are not the same as the w's. If 
the Y
9 s are a rich enough list of data so that we could, if we 
knew the A and B matrixes, recover e(t) at each t from 
knowledge of current and past values of Y(t), and if the e 
process is serially independent, then (8) implies the 
following:
7 
(11) A(0)u(t) = B(0)e(t). 
Then u(t) = A(0)~
l B(0)e(t), and we can substitute in 
equation (10) to obtain responses of Yio e by replacing 
G(s) with G(s)A(0)~
1B(0), for all 
The C and G coefficient sequences in equations (9) 
and (10) can always be recovered from the data by 
relatively simple estimation procedures. A and B in 
equation (8) cannot be recovered from the data without 
identifying assumptions that restrict their form. If the 
identifying assumptions restrict only A (0),B(0), and CI = 
var(e(t)), then they may imply restrictions on E = 
var(w(f)), but they will not imply any restrictions on C or 
G. Since efficient estimation of C is unaffected by 
restrictions on 2, we can in this case proceed stepwise: 
first, estimate C by the usual simple VAR methods and 
form an unrestricted estimate of Z from the estimated 
VAR residuals; second, use the restrictions to extract 
estimates of ,4(0), 1?(0), and Cl from the unrestricted Z 
5For examples of such rational expectations monetarist models, see Barro 
1977 or Sargent and Wallace 1976. 
6 For example, Litterman (1984), Blanchard and Watson (1984), Blanchard 
(1985), Bernanke (forthcoming), and Mazon (1985). 
7 Sargent and Hansen (1984) have pointed out that the assumption that Y is a 
rich enough list of data is not innocuous. However, identifying assumptions are 
never innocuous, and this one will often be reasonable. It can fail if we fail to 
include in the model those variables which move directly in response to policy 
actions. Itrequires also that Z?(0) be square(i.e., that the number of variables in the 
model match the number of behavioral disturbances in the e vector). 
9 matrix. The responses of the system to policy distur-
bances then are available from the formula 
G(s)A(0)~
1B(0), in which we can use the G from the 
original unrestricted VAR estimate together with the 
A(0) and i?(0) estimates from the second step of the 
estimation. 
The most straightforward example of identifying re-
strictions on,4 (0), i?(0), and CI is the Wold causal chain. 
According to this idea, Cl should be diagonal, B(0) = I, 
and A (0) should be triangular and normalized to have 
ones down the main diagonal when variables are ordered 
according to causal priority. Using the fact that withi?(0) 
= I, Z = ,4(0)04(0)', the triangularity of,4(0) implies 
that, once we have put the variables in the proper order, 
we can recover A (0) and CL from Z as Z's unique LDL 
decomposition. That is, it is known that there is a unique 
way to express a positive definite matrix Z in the form 
LDL', where L is lower triangular with ones down its 
diagonal, and D is diagonal. Applying a standard LDL 
algorithm to Z gives us ,4(0) as L and Cl as D. This 
triangular orthogonalization has become a standard 
practice as part of the interpretation of econometric VAR 
models. 
One can also apply the Wold chain idea only to two 
blocks of variables in the system, which requires ,4(0) to 
be block triangular and Cl to be conformably block 
diagonal. This block Wold chain framework underlies all 
the standard econometric theory of simultaneous equa-
tions models, in that it is equivalent to dividing Finto two 
components, one endogenous and the other predeter-
mined. If ,4(0) is lower block triangular, then the upper 
part of the Y vector meets the usual criteria for predeter-
mined variables, namely that their current and past values 
are uncorrected with current values of the disturbances in 
the equations corresponding to the lower block. The block 
Wold chain structure does not by itself achieve identifica-
tion—there remain more free coefficients in ,4(0) and fi 
than in the Z matrix. In the standard approach to 
simultaneous equations, additional identifying restric-
tions are imposed on the,4 sequence. [Thei? sequence is 
taken as B(0) = 1\ B(s) = 0, for s nonzero.] If the 
additional restrictions involve ,4(s) for positive s, then 
they will generally imply restrictions on C and invalidate 
the simple two-stage identification framework. But the 
standard framework does apply to the case where restric-
tions are imposed only on,4 (0). The usual rank and order 
conditions for identification apply, and the usual array of 
simultaneous equations estimators can be applied as if 
equation (11) with B(0) = I were the whole model and the 
estimate of Z obtained from the unrestricted VAR model 
were the moment matrix of the data. The standard 
asymptotic distribution theory applies without modifica-
tion to estimators constructed from (11) and the esti-
mated Z matrix.
8 (An example of empirical research 
exploiting this convenient framework appears in Mazon 
1985.) 
There is no need, though, to remain tied to the 
convention that restrictions on Cl are applied only in 
conjunction with block triangularity restrictions on,4(0). 
The reason it became conventional to impose such 
restrictions is that econometricians do accept the idea that 
often it will be reasonable to assume that behaviorally 
distinct sources of stochastic variation should be inde-
pendent. This idea can be useful even when not coupled to 
a block triangularity assumption on ,4(0). We might, for 
example, assume Cl to be diagonal and achieve identifica-
tion by imposing additional restrictions on ,4(0), thereby 
insisting that all behaviorally distinct sources of dis-
turbance should be uncorrelated. 
An Example of Identifying a VAR Model 
We will examine a simple six-variable quarterly postwar 
VAR model of the U.S. economy over the period 
1948:1-1979:3. The period is truncated at 1979:3 to 
avoid the likely need to allow for a shift in money supply 
behavior around 1979:4. The variables are real GNP 
(Y), real business fixed investment (/), GNP price 
deflator (P), the Ml measure of money (M), unemploy-
ment ([/), and Treasury-bill rates (i?). This list of 
variables is chosen to allow an interesting discussion 
while still being manageably short. The list is too short, 
however, for us to be sure that it will allow us to 
distinguish among behaviorally distinct sources of dis-
turbance. In particular, since it does not include any 
monetary aggregate closely controlled by policy authori-
ties, it forces us to lump together the money supply effects 
arising from the way the banking system uses reserves and 
effects arising directly from actions by the Federal 
Reserve System. Also, since the list includes no fiscal 
variables, changes in expectations about future tax and 
spending policies—which could be important— can show 
up in the model only indirectly. 
A Model With Weak Restrictions 
When a VAR model is fitted to these data, using four lags 
on each variable plus a constant term, and with a weak 
Bayesian prior with independent random walks as the 
8The reason this works out so conveniently is that the likelihood for the data 
has a block diagonal information matrix. This is the condition Durbin (1970) 
pointed out as needed to guarantee that two-step estimation, treating first-step 
parameter estimates as if known exactly, yields the same asymptotic results as joint 
maximum likelihood. 
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prior mean, the resulting estimated system has the 
impulse responses plotted in Chart l.
9 Each of the small 
graphs represents the response, over 32 subsequent 
quarters, of a variable in a given row to a one-standard-
deviation innovation (prediction error) in a variable in a 
given column. In the notation of the previous section, the 
A matrix has been taken to be lower triangular, with the 
variables ordered as shown in the chart. The disturbances 
can be interpreted as behaviorally distinct if one believes 
that a behavioral version of the system would have the 
form of a Wold causal chain. The vertical scale is the 
same for all the plots in a given row, so the relative size of 
effects of various innovations on a given variable can be 
compared by looking at the relative sizes of plotted 
responses across that variable's row. 
Many of the response patterns in Chart 1 do appear to 
have straightforward behavioral interpretations. Hie un-
employment shock (column 5), for example, looks like a 
labor supply disturbance. Unemployment rises temporar-
ily, returning to normal within two years or so, and output 
rises steadily over about two years, then remains at a 
higher level. Investment also follows the pattern of output. 
Interest rates decline slightly and temporarily. Money 
expands smoothly, without a correspondingly large ex-
pansion in the price level, indicating accommodation of 
real balances to a higher level of real activity. It is 
remarkable that the unemployment disturbance effect 
emerges as the largest single influence on the long-run 
behavior of output. 
Though several other of the response patterns lend 
themselves to the telling of interpretive "stories" like the 
one we just developed for unemployment, let us focus 
now on a problem: Do we see money supply and demand 
disturbances in this chart? The rational expectations 
monetarist interpretation is that money innovations are 
9The prior used here and its implementation are simplifications of the 
procedures used by Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984). 
Chart 1 
Response Functions of Variables in a Weakly Restricted VAR Model* 
Innovation to 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment Interest Peak 
Response of Output Investment Prices Money Rate Rate Response 
Years After Shock 
*Each small graph is the response of the variable labeling its row to a one-standard-deviation disturbance of 
the type named at the top of its column. Each response is plotted over an 8-year (32-quarter) time span, and 
the responses in a given row are all measured in the same units. The larger filled-in areas in a given row 
correspond to the disturbances that are important in generating movements in that row's variable. All variables 
are measured in logarithms except for the unemployment rate and interest rate, which are taken as percents. 
The vertical scales are set so that the largest deviation from the horizontal axis is the same distance on the 
graph in each row, and the size of this peak response is noted at the right of each row. Chart 1 is the responses 
to triangularly orthogonalized innovations. 
11 money supply disturbances. The money column (4) of 
Chart 1 shows that prices respond strongly and persistent-
ly, although with a delay, to money innovations, while 
real variables respond very weakly. The weakness of the 
real responses does not fit rational expectations mone-
tarist theory well. Also, there is a negligible interest rate 
response. Since there is no immediate response in the 
level of prices or output, it is difficult to explain how, with 
a fixed money demand schedule, the public is led to 
accept a jump in the money stock. 
Many economists would rather, in any case, treat 
short-term interest rates as the monetary policy variable. 
The interest rate column (6) of Chart 1 shows substantial, 
temporary negative effects on output of a rise in interest 
rates. It also shows a large, persistent negative effect of 
the interest rate rise on the money stock. However, there 
is little persistent effect of the monetary contraction on 
prices, and indeed an initial positive effect on prices. 
Furthermore, with a fixed money demand schedule, it is 
hard to see why the quickly dissipated rise in nominal 
interest rates leads to a very persistent decline in the 
money stock. 
Two Different Identifications of the Model 
Charts 2 and 3 represent two different identifications of 
this VAR system. In each case, identification is limited to 
separating demand and supply of money from each other 
and from a block of remaining equations. In each case, the 
behavioral disturbances e are taken to be mutually 
uncorrected. 
• The First Identification 
The model generating Chart 2 postulates that the money 
supply equation connects money innovations with in-
terest rate innovations and that no other variables enter. 
This rests on the idea that the monetary authority and the 
banks can see interest rates and indicators of movements 
in monetary aggregates immediately, but can only react to 
the remaining variables in the economy after a delay 
because data on these variables are released later. The 
money demand equation in this model allows money 
innovations to depend on innovations in interest rates, 
output, and the price level. Investment demand is postu-
lated to make investment innovations equivalent to 
investment demand innovations—that is, investment 
demand reacts to other variables only with a delay. The 
three other equations are postulated to determine output, 
price, and unemployment innovations from three more 
independent innovations and the innovations in invest-
ment and interest rates. These three equations are 
normalized to have a block triangular set of coefficients 
on price, output, and unemployment. Note that there is an 
important identifying restriction: the money stock innova-
tion is not allowed into the equations other than money 
supply and demand; monetary sector variables feed back 
into the remainder of the model only via interest rates. 
The equations for this system and their estimated 
coefficients are listed below: 
Money Supply 
(12) r= 71.2m + et 
(46.0) 
Money Demand 
(13) m= .283\y + .224\p- .0081r + e2 
(.103) (.128) (.0043) 
Output 
(14) y = -.00\35r + .132 i + eA 
(.00308) (.024) 
Price 
(15) p = - OOlOr 4- .045^ + .00364/ + e5 
(.0012) (.054) (.015) 
Unemployment 
(16) u= .11 Gr 20. ly -1.48/- 8.98p + e6 
(.045) (2.5) (.72) (4.1) 
Investment Demand 
(17) i=e3. 
The data on all variables are logged except for U and R, 
which are measured in percent. Approximate standard 
errors are given in parentheses below the coefficients.
1
0 
The money demand and supply equations are perhaps 
surprisingly reasonable, given that they are identified only 
by exclusion restrictions on innovations. The response to 
a money supply shock shown in Chart 2 is quite different 
from either the money shock or interest shock response of 
Chart 1, being close to a difference of those two response 
10The standard errors are based on the approximate second derivative matrix 
accumulated during the search for the likelihood maximum by a BFGS-update 
optimization algorithm. (See Gill, Murray, and Wright 1981, p. 119.) Such an 
approximate Hessian need not be very accurate, even when the search algorithm 
has worked well in finding the likelihood maximum attained. 
12 Christopher A. Sims 
Forecasting Models for Policy Analysis 
Charts 2 and 3 
Response Functions of VAR Model Variables for Two Different Identifications* 
Chart 2 Responses for the First Identification 
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Chart 3 Responses for the Second Identification 
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*See note for Chart 1. The identifying restrictions used here are designed to get better estimates of responses to 
money supply shocks. Each set of identifying assumptions is described in more detail in the text. 
13 patterns. Now a money supply shock (Chart 2, column 1) 
consists of simultaneous jumps upward in interest rates 
and downward in money stock. The money stock move-
ment increases over the next few quarters and remains 
very persistent. The interest rate movement remains 
temporary, but now the delayed yet persistent movement 
in prices shrinks real balances, so that the persistence in 
the nominal money stock, despite the evanescence of the 
interest rate rise, is not puzzling. Output, investment, and 
unemployment all take plausible business-cycle-like ex-
cursions in response to the money supply shock. 
The estimated response to a money demand dis-
turbance (Chart 2, column 2) is harder to rationalize. 
That a money demand shock should raise interest rates 
and the money stock initially and result in a persistent 
decline in output is not unreasonable. But that it should 
have no immediate effect on prices and, in the long run, 
should raise prices, is not so reasonable. There are several 
possible explanations in terms of weaknesses in identify-
ing assumptions. One is the problem that by putting M1 in 
the money supply equation, we forego separating bank 
behavior from Federal Reserve behavior and thereby 
possibly also forego properly separating demand from 
supply behavior. Another explanation is that without 
fiscal variables, a change in the current debt or in 
expected future real federal surpluses might generate 
what is identified here as a money demand shock. A rise 
in the debt through a current deficit, unmatched by a rise 
in expected future real surpluses, would generate the 
following effects: an increase in desired money holdings 
(through an increase in the scale of the public's nominal 
investment portfolio), a rise in the interest rate, and 
upward pressure on prices. Finally, the model does not 
contain exchange rate or commodity price variables. A 
fall in the value of the dollar or a rise in commodity prices 
could create increased transactions demand for money, 
anticipated GNP-deflator inflation, a rise in interest rates, 
and a decline in output. 
• The Second Identification 
Before giving up on identifying money demand, however, 
two or three more experiments with modified sets of 
identifying restrictions were tried. In one, the money 
innovation was allowed to enter the price equation 
directly. This specification made the reaction to an 
estimated money demand shock no more reasonable, but 
it made the price equation disturbance start to behave like 
a money demand shock. Listed below are the innovation 
equations for this interpretation of the system, renormal-
ized so that the price equation is normalized on money, 
and vice versa: 
Money Supply 
(18) r= 82.0 m + el 
(13.0) 
Money Demand 
(19) m= .29y - .0088/ + .90p - .0082r + e2 
(.08) (.0164) (.22) (.0022) 
Output 
(20) y = —.0021r + A3i + e3  (.0021) (.02) 
Price 
(21) p = —.0058r + .22y - ,50m + e5 
(.0025) (.06) (.11) 
Unemployment 
(22) u =-Mr-20Ay - 1.49/— 8.97/? + e6  (.04) (1.1) (.36) (1.17) 
Investment Demand 
(23) /=e4. 
Chart 3 itself now provides a more believable response 
to the money demand shock (column 2). Interest rates 
rise, money stock rises, and prices fall at first. Output falls 
and stays low. The money stock remains high, and prices 
eventually rise to eliminate the higher real balances. It is 
not easy to understand why output should remain de-
pressed for so long after interest rates and real balances 
return to normal, but the response is small enough that it 
may not be statistically significant. Note that the effects of 
the money demand shock on other variables are all 
relatively weak, but that the money demand shock 
produces an initial impact on money stock of the same 
order of magnitude as the initial impact of the money 
supply shock. This means that, though money supply 
shocks in this model are a powerful influence on both 
prices and real business cycle behavior, the quarter-to-
quarter movements in the money stock contain a large 
component of money demand shifts. The model suggests 
that stable money supply behavior would help stabilize 
the economy, but it also suggests that stable money 
supply behavior is quite different from stable money stock 
in a quarterly time frame. 
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While Chart 3 is appealing, equations (19) and (21) 
are less so. Why should money demand be more 
responsive to price than to output in the short run? What is 
the interpretation of the negative response of price to 
money in the nonmonetary block of the model? The 
conclusion must be that this interpretation, like the 
previous one, is subject to serious question. One ought to 
have a model including exchange rates, commodity 
prices, fiscal variables, and a more directly controlled 
monetary aggregate before drawing any firm implications 
for policy. 
What the Exercise Suggests 
Nonetheless, this exercise suggests that a relatively 
simple expansion on the Wold causal chain identification 
scheme, which has been regularly applied in VAR 
models, can yield important insights. Here it appears that 
money supply effects are more important for inflation and 
output—and that they tie short-run output effects to long-
run price effects more tightly—than one would think if 
limited to a framework in which behavioral disturbances 
coincide with variable innovations. If this interpretation 
were correct, it would imply that conventional econo-
metric macromodeling which ignores endogeneity of 
monetary policy instruments is likely to be quite mis-
leading. It also suggests that the more naive versions of 
both rational expectations monetarism and conventional 
monetarism are mistaken. The effects of money supply 
shocks do not operate through contemporaneous price 
surprises, as simple rational expectations monetarism 
would suggest, nor are money stock innovations nearly 
entirely made up of money supply shocks. Policy pre-
scriptions for eliminating fluctuations of the money stock 
over short periods are not supported. Although the model 
attributes most money stock variation over long horizons 
to money supply shifts, much of the unpredictable 
quarter-to-quarter variation in money stock comes from 
demand and other influences. 
Were the patterns of responses to money supply 
shocks found here to be substantiated in a more detailed 
VAR model, it would be reasonable to use them in 
determining optimal policy reactions to disturbances in 
money demand, exchange rates, labor supply, or the like. 
Of course, if use of the model in this way led to drastic 
shifts in policy, there would be questions about identifica-
tion. If it suggested unprecedentedly large movements in 
policy instruments, it would be doubtful that the VAR 
model's linear structure would remain fixed. If it sug-
gested dramatic changes in the trend or degree of 
smoothness in prices, the rational expectations critique 
suggests a reason for concern about a different kind of 
nonlinearity. 
But policy analysis based on a rational expectations 
equilibrium model is suspect for the same class of 
reasons. Such a model will almost inevitably have a 
weaker, more heuristic connection to the data than a 
VAR model, so that all its implications are suspect from 
the start. It will rely on approximate assumptions about 
functional forms for tastes and technology in the 
economy—assumptions that will be accurate only over 
some reasonable range of variation in the economy's 
behavior. It will make assumptions about market struc-
ture and individual rationality which are sure to be 
incorrect to some degree. Since the limitations of such a 
model are different from the limitations of a VAR model, 
even though conceptually similar, it will often be useful to 
think about the consequences of policy changes in the 
context of such rational expectations models as well as in 
the context of VAR models. There is a tradeoff between 
types of models for policy analysis, not a hierarchy of 
them. 
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